

GOALS AND PROCESSES IN SPANISH POLITICS: *

Modernization, yes - but Western
Incorporation, or Autonomy?

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1. Introduction: the missing French revolution

I have to confess from the very beginning that this is very much a paper written by an outsider. There will be almost no names, no years, no places indicated. It is certainly based on observations of Spain during many years from the vantage point of a person who has travelled in all parts of the country, spoken with many people and lived for months every year since 1970, in the country. But the focus of the paper is only on some basic, fundamental aspects as seen by the present author, with no reflection of the detail, even with no effort, one might say even with no wish, to give attention to details. However, the purpose is ^{ambitious} to try to come to grips with Spanish politics, some sort of outsider's guide to the phenomenon, "how to interpret what you read in newspapers". And as such the only excuse one could have would be that sometimes outsiders see things that are overshadowed by myriads of details for the insider. Synthesis requires distance.

A basic impression a foreigner gets when he tries to discuss politics in Spain, a point about which there is considerable consensus, is that Spain according to the Spanish is somehow "lagging behind." This presupposes a relatively uni-dimensional and uni-directional view of history, and the question is: which is that dimension on which Spain might be said to be lagging behind, the dimension that seems to be troubling so many Spaniards?

One possible answer, and here I am very much indebted to one first rate Spanish analyst of the Spanish scene, Amando de Miguel, would be that Spain never underwent the process that in the country to the North of Spain is known as la grande revolution (of 1789), and in other countries is known as the French Revolution. Let us say that before that revolution France was divided into five classes or castes: on top the Church, then the Aristocracy, then the tiers-état, the bourgeoisie, the merchants; and then at the bottom the working class, in the city and in the countryside, and various groups of marginalized people, such as Jews, Arabs, gypsies, women. Let us further say that the revolution of 1789

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was that of class number 3 against classes number 1 and 2 and that as a result of all the convulsions the power of the first two institutions, Church and Aristocracy, was considerably reduced. Class No. 3 became dominant and still is. Classes Nos. 4 and 5 remained at the bottom - and still are, with some exceptions for the socialist countries.

But that is not the same as saying that the power of those people in Classes 1 and 2 was much reduced. They could undergo transformations, much like a brahmin or kshatriyah in India who knew perfectly well when to study English so as to be able to enter the Indian Civil Service and who know equally well today the importance of launching their sons into a solid career pattern by sending them to computer courses as quickly as possible. From serving God to serving the British to serving the Computer the distance is not so big as one might believe: it all amounts to securing for oneself a position at the top of society as the social formation evolves, and for the offspring, of course.

So, the Churchpeople became intellectuals, and in the case of France to a very large extent first rate intellectuals, with a major impact on what today is known as modern science and arts, as culture in general. And the Aristocrats continued doing what they had already done for some time: they became bureaucrats, filling top positions in the offices of the expanding state, more particularly the foreign ministry and other ministries of high prestige. And the victors of the French Revolution, the commercial people continued as commercial people only with more freedom, with a higher status: they became industrial capitalists, benefiting from the other revolution at the same time, the industrial revolution in England. And thus the three components of what later on, in the second half of the 20th century was to become the rock basis of the post-modern states, technocracy, took shape: bureaucrats and capitalists, supported by intellectuals turned into loyal servants of either, the intelligentsia. Ruling over workers, peasants, foreigners and women; people. Church, Aristocracy and Military were still there to rule them. But very many of them had become civil servants and at least had to rule according to rules.

The point would now be that this did not happen in Spain, possibly because the Church was enormously strengthened by the Inquisition and the Aristocracy by colonies. As a result the power of the Church and the Aristocracy continued much beyond its allotted time in other European countries, particularly the

countries transalpina. Of course this has something to do with the Reformation: the power of the ^{Church} was already weakened through that onslaught on the Catholic Church. And it had to do with economic and military factors. The Church people, instead of becoming intellectuals, remained in the Church with two notable consequences: Spain has for the last two centuries been an undercontributor to the world intellectual life both in the sense of science and in the sense of the arts. Those who have contributed have tended to do so from abroad, in exile (France, / Mexico) like Picasso. At the same time Spain has had an overproduction of priests, even to the point of using them as an export product.

And the same applies to the aristocrats: they continued as landed gentry instead of getting into the new, "modern" institutions, and of course also went into the military, the obvious solution for the younger sons in a noble family. As a result feudal land-holding systems continued being very strong, and the military combined two basic characteristics: on the one hand very big and top heavy as it contains many people who in other countries would have been elsewhere; on the other hand qualitatively not up to date since military professionalism probably has had to fight its way through layers of feudalistic conservatism, and has not been able to ride on a general wave of state-supported professionalism in the country as a whole. They never became civil servants like in other countries, remaining a state within the state with its own jurisdiction, also for civilians "defaming the military".

Maybe it could be said that there was a third aspect to it: maybe the capitalist became less entrepreneurial, less innovative, more inclined to exercise their trade (literally speaking) as a function of high status than as a function of professional training, "business administration". But one can not say that the tiers-état was prevented from growing; only the growth was not accompanied by the demise of the other two institutions. As commercial capitalism was transformed into industrial capitalism a working class emerged, and had as its social counterpoints not only capitalists but also a highly status quo oriented church, a feudal land-holding class and

a military capable of fighting internal war, if not capable of fighting the armies of other countries (with the exception of even more feudal Morocco). The class contradictions became very strong indeed, and were not softened by large groups of intellectuals progressively inclined, a modern state that understood the value of coopting rather than fighting workers, not to mention a military not frightened by the working class. The conflict with capitalists may have been about the same as in the other countries, but the other factors were different and to a large extent seem to explain not only the alignments in the Spanish Civil War, but also why that Civil War took place in Spain. (It could also have been Portugal or Italy, but there the fascists were already in power).

2. Three phases of "proyecto modernizacion".

The Movement of 18th July 1936 won the Civil War, and its task and political function was obvious, and follows from what has been said. On the one hand theirs was the task of continuing the long-lasting first chapter, the modernization of Spanish capitalism, making it less local, more national by means of the INI, even transnational by incorporating it in transnational corporations; while at the same time keeping the working class under control. On the other hand the three ruling pillars of society were not to be challenged. They were even to provide the leadership: the Church, the property, capital and landowners, the military - of course with some of the modifications that follow in the wake of industrialization and urbanization. And thus it still is: los poderes fácticos, the factual powers remain precisely that.

In short, modernization along the axis of corporation-building, not along the axis of bureaucracy-building. Good local administration, the ayuntamiento, yes, but not at the national level. A state, headed by a government that might concentrate more power in the organs of the state than in the Church and land/property holding class the military, was certainly not wanted. The Franco period was an

institutionalized military coup where governance was exercised in relatively complete accordance with the three powers mentioned, and was, as Franco said, a hierarchy rather than a dictatorship. There was a tension, though: there was also a populist element in the movimiento, a cult of the common man in general and the working class man (certainly not woman) in particular which should not be underestimated. But it was not strong enough to carry real conviction, and as the 1950s and 1960s came to an end it became very, very clear that under these conditions Spain would never become a really "modern" country. By the time Franco died, November 1975, there must have been consensus about this: the proyecto modernización had come to a grinding halt while at the same time a new generation had come to political maturity, in their late 30s and early 40s (Suarez, Gonzalez), unmarked by the extreme cruelty of the Civil War and the hatred that followed in its wake or at least considerably less marked than those in their sixties and seventies.

In short, a change was overdue and would in fact have taken place peacefully even if Franco had died five years earlier; ten years earlier perhaps being too much. And the first political generation after Franco had as its task the second chapter in the proyecto modernización: the increase of popular participation through multi-party system, elections, some kind of accountability at the municipal and national level, and free trade unions. It also had as a task to try to handle the contradictions arising from the struggle for local autonomy, and "terrorism". The Spanish people demanded democracy; so did NATO and the European Community - as a necessary condition for possible entry to the clubs of gentlemen countries.

Of course, the Spanish social structure reacted against these attempts. Of course there was the aborted coup of 23rd February 1981, "23 F", and of course, it took place in Parliament, precisely to challenge the validity of parliamentary democracy. And of course the Church, the land/property holding class and the military were ambivalent. On the one hand fearful of what will be the next steps along the axis of modernization, on the

other hand very well knowing that some modernization was overdue, and could also ultimately be in their own interest if skillfully handled. Moreover, the King was seen as being more constitutional, less monarchic. The coup failed. Did it come too late - or too early?

I think it is fair to say that the Spanish people in the elections of October 1982, expressed a rather overwhelming support for the Social Democratic Party, PSOE. However, I do not think that this can be interpreted as a vote in favor of socialism in any reasonable interpretation of that word. Nor did PSOE present itself with a socialist programme. What they did was to come forward as a new force that could carry the proyecto modernización still some steps further, a third chapter in the chain carried by the movimiento (with predecessors), then the UCD (the Central Democratic Union, 1977-82) and then possibly by PSOE. The task they set themselves was not necessarily to reduce unemployment, although at 17% it is the highest in Europe, with Turkey - with one more per minute. Nor is the task to improve the real salary of the workers. Rather, they wanted to improve the capital-accumulation of the capitalists so as to make it possible for them to invest more. They did not argue in terms of distribution of the gains from these investments; rather, such gains were to be reinvested. In a sense the goal was much more modest: carrying further the work of creating strong national, and transnationally functioning corporations; consolidating democracy; and then the task of building a more efficient, more modern bureaucracy.

Of course, they were accused of having plans of nationalizing capital; few things were, it seems, more remote from their minds, as can be seen from the Rumasa example. The model was certainly not an Eastern European one, not even a Northern European, Swedish one, but more the Austrian model of Partnerschaft: how the state can mediate the successful cooperation between capital and labor with a view to strengthening the country as a whole. Not Marx (he was taken out of the party programme ~~the~~ many

years before), certainly not Lenin, not even Palme, but to some extent Kreisky. Where the movimiento and the UCD had been pushing the system along the corporation-building dimension PSOE wanted to strengthen the state as such, but not necessarily as an economic actor. Modernizing, not radicalizing - socialism would have to wait 25 years. Just disciplining the bureaucrats will already be something, having them show up in their offices on time in the morning and staying till the end of the working day, not engaging in active and directive influences on the Spanish economy à la japonaise or à la française. The enemy was not capitalism but the scandalous inaction of the Spanish authorities in connection with colza, the oil scandal, the "pneumonia toxica" with its close to 400 victims. The scandal crystallized the issue. Consequently, a new coup should not be necessary as class interests are not threatened. But if it takes place the symbolically correct place would be in a Ministry, to challenge secular, civilian power.

I think this is relatively clear, and I also think it is highly likely that PSOE will be able to do this. There is support in the population at large from the bottom till way into the top of society, and the people carrying out the task seem to be sufficiently incorrupt, puritan and efficient to do exactly this kind of thing: promotion according to merit rather than seniority; better police, cleaner jails (with visita conyugal); modern divorce/abortion practices, I think it is also clear that the classes that generally would not support PSOE realize that they themselves would never be able to carry out proyecto modernizacion, third phase, bureaucracy-building, as well as PSOE can do it.

Moreover, they probably also realize that a modern state under their control could be a better instrument promoting the interests of capital, property and even military and church than the old-fashioned administrative machinery replete with feudal characteristics. This being the case the rest is a problem of wait and see. And one obvious prediction would be that after PSOE has carried out this historical task the basic powers may come together again and reap the harvest, gain political power, repossess state bureaucracies and see to it that they will not be made use of to carry out any major distributive function, while at the same time capital accumulation can go on unabated, at least to the extent that international conditions permit.

3. Six aspects of Spanish social cosmology.

However, international conditions are not the only one playing a role in this connection. There is also a deeply seated Spanish culture, a Spanish cosmology as a special version of Occidental cosmology. These are the unquestioned, underlying assumptions, the code contained in the culture of Spanish society, and not easily changed although it will have to adjust to some extent to the changes in Spanish social structure under the proyecto modernización.

The following six points could perhaps be made about the Spanish version of the Occident.

Like the rest of the West Spain sees the world space as divided into two, the Center which is Western and the Periphery which is non-Western but wanting and/or trying to become more like the West. The problem is where Spain is located, and here there is a certain schizophrenia at work. There is the image of Spain once upon a time as the very center of the Center. On the other hand there is the image of Spain today as being very much in the periphery of the

Center, but hanging on to it as best it can. And then, on the third hand: there is the image of Spain endangered, possibly dropping out through a hole in that center, being mistaken for a Maghreb or a Latin American country.

The Spanish time perspective is perhaps particularly important in this connection. I do not think it can be said to be entirely Western in the modern sense. Of course, there is the Idea of Progress. Time has an arrow; if not there would have been no proyecto modernización at all. But there are also doubts about this upward trend, and how could it be otherwise with such a grandiose past? And then there is the other aspect of modern occidental time cosmology: the idea that time is scarce. Time is like a commodity, something to be processed carefully, in a rational manner, even on a market by making one's time available to the highest bidder. But the two great contributions of Spanish culture in this domain, the fiesta and the siesta, are clear indications in the opposite direction. Here vast time pockets are defined, like natural parts or reservations in space, with clear off-limits signs. These pockets are not for rational processing. Obviously any proyecto modernización will have to question these time pockets, perhaps invade them, making lunch breaks shorter and fiestas fewer, making more time available for rational processing into modernization. And equally obviously this will meet with considerable resistance as the very time concepts just mentioned are clear vestiges from feudal or medieval times, clear indicators of what it means not to have undergone that revolutionary transformation mentioned in the beginning.

Then, there is the dimension of knowledge. The penetration into Spanish intellectual life of the Anglo-saxon intellectual style, with empiricism and very modest theory-formation, is obvious. It has been a part of the general americanization process of the country, encouraged both under the first and the second phases of the proyecto modernización,

← It may now, perhaps, become somewhat less prominent, the third PSOE phase probably being more Europe oriented. But there is still a solid clerical intellectual infrastructure of highly deductive reasoning with a heavy emphasis on the linguistic constructions themselves, their elegance,

their style. Intellectual style becomes above all language style; intellectual form becomes the form of verbal expression. The general model is "esthetic" rather than "scientific" in the Anglo-saxon sense. In being so the direct connection with centuries past, with the great era of Spanish intellectual achievements both philosophical and literary is clearly seen; there is no discontinuity. But on the other hand there is little continuity linking up with the present either, and particularly not with the kind of intellectual constructions that are underlying the proyecto modernización. More particularly, this means that the modernization project can only draw upon certain intellectuals such as business administration; not upon the whole intellectual class as such.

I think the relations to nature can be best symbolized through the corrida, the bull fight: nature as a beast, even black and threatening, to be conquered through acts of heroism by the selected few, with the overwhelming majority of the population safely protected as spectators in this gigantic struggle between Naturaleza and Hombre. With this as a metaphor the conquest, domestication, including killing of nature by modern science and technology and their protagonists, researchers and technicians that almost invariably are men, even macho men, becomes natural. But the usually neglected aspect of this, the spectator role enjoyed by the rest of the population also becomes natural: they pay the entrance fee (taxes), watch the play, and reap the harvest, without real participation. To this it may be objected that real participation is for the few anyhow; most people only reap the harvest of the scientific and technological revolution (STR) as consumers, nothing more. But just as the spectators do not rush out into the arena of the bull-fight in order to save the bull in the last moment (they only complain about the bull fighter if he is an inefficient / ^{killer}), the spectator role has as an implication that they will not rush into nature to save nature from the attack of scientists and technicians either. In other words, one would expect nature to have few active defenders in a country with this basic attitude, and as a consequence the suffering of nature and the environmental degradation will tend to pass unnoticed. I will venture

a guess: those who rush to the rescue of degrading eco-systems will also tend to be very antagonistic to bull-fights----. Concretely, however, this means that nothing of much significance from attitudinal or behavioural point of view will stand in the way of the type of destruction of nature so clearly associated with modernization in the past and also ^{basically} at present. Thus, the future is bleak-arid - with desertification of nature as a very real possibility, and not only in the south-west.

If we move on from there to person-person relations I think it could rapidly be concluded that they are very vertical and individualistic as in the Occident in general, only more so. The distance between high and low in society at large and almost all organizations in general is considerable, eg. as witnessed by such astounding ways of addressing authorities as "Excelentísimo" or "Ilustrísimo" - or the not at all infrequent don as attribute to a man who has somehow made it, and also has the physical stature that probably is a necessary condition. And the individualism takes the form of an often somewhat inflated Ego, highly sensitive to any sign of disrespect, and for that reason also extremely vulnerable, easily hurt. In a society that vertical and that individualistic - to the point of extreme loneliness - much suffering is the almost inevitable consequence. Upward social mobility is seen as the medicine for that suffering, but only for a short while: there will always be more steps on the ladder, higher up. And this can then be related to what has been said about the time perspective: the more suffering on the public arena the more important some private space, including time, for the healing of the soul, and body too for that matter. The demand on the shrinking family (from extensive to nuclear) in order to minister to these concerns are considerable. This is more than the family system can handle ^{today} particularly in a period when the women are entering the work force more and more.

Finally, there is the relation to God. Of course God is not so alive as before. But he is not dead, either - I am not even sure he is dying. But whatever His state of health in the Spanish setting I think it can be said that the Spanish God was more awesome, more omnipotent,

more on top of all human beings than many other gods in Christianity. After all, the country of the Inquisition needed a God of that type, and vice versa and such gods do not die that easily. They tend to be not only omnipotent, but also highly monopolistic, very jealous of any competitive God.

To summarize the last three points one may say that the Spanish social cosmology illustrates better than many other social cosmologies in the Occident the image provided by the first part of the Bible, Genesis, of the world order: God on top, nature very much at the bottom, and humanity in between, but definitely with man on top and woman at the bottom. The distance from one layer to the next is considerable. Is it then really to be expected that such basic forms disappear even if God's health is not what it used to be? Or is it not rather to be expected that the successors to God, meaning Ideology, will also tend to be placed high above ordinary mortals and seen as equally unquestionably omniscient if not omnipotent, and certainly as equally jealous of competitors? In short, is it not to be expected that secular ideologies will tend to be on the scene one at the time, and if there are more of them the clashes will tend to become violent since they regard themselves as entirely justified in their claim to rule the ground alone? In short, that the successor to firm monotheism is mono-ideologism?

I draw from this one conclusion: Spain will tend to celebrate one ideology at the time, and one priesthood - meaning political party - at the time. For modernization to come about some element of secularization was indispensable. Franco was able to beat the marxist competitor as successor to God, to pretend that God was still where he used to be, to install a new priesthood, something reminiscent of a political party, the Movimiento, and by using basically unemployed clergy as intellectuals in a secularizing country for his proyecto modernización; the Opus Dei, all important carrier of the process, also providing much continuity. But when his time was out and the second phase was ushered in under the heading of UCD, with legitimacy given to a secular party system, parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy the movimiento of course had to be dissolved; it could not share the ground with UCD and the new

elements incorporated in it. Correspondingly when its time was up, UCD had to yield to PSOE (the socialdemocratic party) to the point of its own total dissolution, which took surprisingly little time to achieve. The electorate had understood the signals: a new God was in, the old one was out; there is no such thing as both of them at the same time.

That, of course, does not mean that the Spanish party system is a single party system. What it means is only that there is only one ruler at the time, according to this type of theory: one cannot have both the old God and the new God, the old party in power and the new party in power. The pretendent, the challenger may be waiting back stage: he has not yet attained divine dimensions. What does follow from this theory, however, is something which at least is daring as an hypothesis and might sound totally out of touch with reality: when time is up for PSOE, which may be after one or two (hardly more) periods, still another party is ushered in for still another phase of proyecto modernización, and it is the duty of PSOE to mark the end of its period with proper dissolution - following the movimiento and the UCD to the grave

Actually, it is not so difficult to write a scenario for how this could make political sense. PSOE modernizes bureaucracy, gives corporations a relatively free hand as long as they do their task properly and diligently. Profits are reinvested, not redistributed to the producers, nor to the consumers. Some parts of the economic growth process are gently steered by a modernized bureaucracy. Workers are kept at bay, demands are channeled in an orderly manner through trade unions rather than strikes, there is little or no increase in real wages, there is little or no decrease in unemployment. The hope is that after some years of this there will be a cake of sufficient size and sufficiently guaranteed growth to start proyecto redistribución.

However, needless to say such processes create counter-processes. Conservative forces will understand that nobody is better at

keeping the workers at bay than a "workers' party". They will be lying relatively low to start with. But as the process gains some momentum they will more and more aggressively launch their demands for power, of course to prevent redistribution and keep the surplus value extracted ^{in the hands of} / ^{the} the owners of/means of production (to use a slightly classical formula), ostensibly in order to promote the old values of the clergy, the land owners and the military. And at the same time there will be another counter-process inside the Spanish left: redistribution now. It will be increasingly militant in its style, not necessarily take the form of a classical communist/marxist party, but of a socialist party to the left, less concerned with proyecto modernizaci3n, considerably more with proyecto redistribuci3n. These two counter-processes will then feed into each other, polarizing the political stage. But as ^{the old} / right has been longer on the scene than any new left they may gain power. The middle (PSOE) will be dissolved through inner fighting and the mechanisms of the process explored above, and the result will be a rightist government with a more leftist one waiting for its time (phase five) to come. Well, only time will show. There may also be "green" surprises (phase six?)

From what has been said so far it is obvious that proyecto modernizaci3n is no easy task. There are two important counter-vailing forces: (1) the highly concrete social structures translated into social actors that were not incorporated because of the revolution that did not take place (clergy, land-owners and property-capital owners in general, military); (2) the less visible but perhaps even more significant cultural factor of an only partly modernized social cosmology. More particularly, there is a certain schizophrenia in the Spanish social cosmology as here portrayed. Spain sees herself as being a part of the Center, yes, but with two important observations: in its periphery, and with the danger of falling out, into the world Periphery, somewhere. There is a "modern" time concept, yes, but there are also very important remnants of the time concepts of older ages, particularly outside the Basque and Catalan provinces. The latter is actually an important point: the more successful the proyecto modernizaci3n, which is essentially a Castillan catching -up exercise,

the less the balance of power will tip in favor of the non-Castilian "minorities" to the North and the Northeast. Further, there is plenty of "modern" scientific thought in the ^{empiricist} sense; but there is also very much of the deductivist rationalism of earlier periods, and what looks like a very uneasy balance between the two. And as to the last three and most social aspects of social cosmology as here conceived of: secularism, as it has evolved in the countries Spain to some extent is imitating, has done much to collapse the distance between God and nature, via humankind, by dethroning God and also his secular successors in the sense of ideologies, upgrading nature considerably into some kind of partnership with man; trying to eliminate as much as possible of the differentials between men and women, trying to make societies more egalitarian, more just, more equitable. None of this is unknown in Spain only that the process has not in general come as far as further North in Europe or in North America. But up there the cosmology has been changing for some groups away from "modern, expansionist, occidental" - so by the time Spain arrives there may be only few people left to welcome them.

4. Outside modernization assistance: the European Community and NATO

Hence, it is not strange if Spanish modernizing forces feel that they have to search for powerful allies outside the country in their efforts to push Spain towards higher levels of modernization. In the old days this might have taken the form of inviting an outside power to colonize the country, such as Britain to build a commercial system, or France to build a state controlled infrastructure with excellent roads and PTT facilities. No country seems to have been effectively colonized by both so that in Africa today one can see former British colonies with commercial structures in the private sector rather well established and former French colonies with excellent roads and PTT services not so prominent in former British colonies, whereas shop-keeper commercialism is less developed in former French colonies, or so it seems. But that period is out; it would also have been incompatible with Spanish self-images: What does one do today - if one cannot be modernized by other countries, like Japan by Germany in the early Meiji period.

Of course one invites international organizations to do the same job, be they in the private commercial sector in the form of transnational corporations, or in the public non-commercial sector in the form

of intergovernmental organizations. The modernization of Spanish corporations was to a large extent carried out by transnational corporations, by the locking-in effect on local Spanish branches of "membership" in such enterprises. During the Franco period an astounding number of products had Hecho en España on them, but it did not say by whom: a TNC, of course. The modernism of the commercial elites in Spain was totally compatible with this kind of transnational membership, even in a peripheral role as long as one could learn through imitation. But in the governmental sectors in general, and the military in particular, the ambivalence must have been more dominant. If Spain did not gain membership in the European Community or NATO it was not only because of resistance in those organizations but also because of ambivalence inside Spain itself.

That ambivalence is still there, to some extent. Membership in the European Community means reduced autonomy for Spain as a country, and, more importantly, from the point of view of the elites in and around Madrid: less autonomy for the classical elites. They would become slowly irrelevant through the locking-in effect, the European Community requiring a high level of modernization or even technocratisation in a member country in order to have opposite numbers with whom to deal. NATO would ask for the same: a professional army, not an army based on traditional values and skills and essentially geared to internal defense against the enemies of the classical elites - stationed not at the border, but around major population centres.

In short, the theory that EC and NATO membership will have a modernizing effect is probably correct, as is the theory of ambivalence of the classical elites, perhaps seeing the step as inevitable but at the same time deploring the consequences for themselves and their descendants who will have to leave the leisurely style of the aristocracy of yesterday and go to computer schools instead. And this is what sometimes baffles the ^{uninformed} outside observer: the resistance to EC and NATO is not necessarily from the left as in countries to the North, but from the right! A fact easily understood in the light of what has been said above. but often misunderstood in the international press. The European Community and the NATO are by many, perhaps most, in Spain seen as legitimizers. Membership is seen as the final validation of Spain, as having passed the exam in modernization, with the three disciplines of economic growth, democracy and administrative adequacy. Only the political right would object to the latter two, in that sense "rejecting Europe".

So much for what the European Community and NATO can do for modernization, by providing unshakable standards from which Spain cannot escape, because she would be in a minority of one (or only a few) in the search for alternatives within these organizations of "modern" countries. No doubt modernization of Spain is on the list of motivations for the other member countries in inviting Spain to join, including the locking-in effect they hope to have on ^{traditional, non-democratic} Spanish elites. But what would be the other motivations the leading powers in these organizations, and the secretariates, might have? It is hardly very credible that they are only interested in Spanish membership in order to secure parliamentary democracy, constitutional monarchy, free trade unions. There might also be some other motivations. What can Spain do for the Community? For NATO?

5. Possible Western motivation for Spanish incorporation

As we are dealing with the same basic system, the Northwestern part of the world, the First world, I think the motivations of the European Community and NATO are relatively similar, and can be analyzed in a highly parallel fashion for these two organizations.

First, and most obvious, there is the idea of "integrating" Spain by playing on her eagerness to be a part of the Center and her fear of being relegated to the world Periphery, by giving her a peripheral position in the economic and political/military cycles set up by the center of the Center. In the economic terms of the European Community, with its emphasis on the free movement of capital, labor, raw materials and finished goods/services and technology this certainly means facilitating the ^{EC} access to Spanish capital that cannot be invested in Spain with sufficient hopes of profit. On the other hand, it ^{also} means access by capital combined with high technology from the core of the European Community to the Spanish periphery, of course in cooperation with local Spanish firms. It means access to Spanish markets for advanced goods/services, but it also means that less advanced goods, particularly in the sector of fruits and vegetables will have access to European Community markets with all this entails, particularly for France, at the time being. On the other hand, it might

also in the longer run mean a liberation of French agricultural capital and manpower to more industrial pursuits, leaving agriculture with its products to the Spanish periphery of this Community Center. Some years ago it would have meant even more access to excess Spanish labor; today this is more problematic although membership in the European Community will make it difficult to send that Spanish labor home. Finally, from the point of view of the center Spanish membership means more sharing of the markets Spain has established elsewhere in the world (Latin America, Mediterranean countries) with other EC countries. But in return for all of this Spain will also get her share of the funds for peripheral district development, etc.

The same approach can be used in exploring the motivations of NATO for Spanish membership. No doubt there will be funds available for building military infrastructure, for professionalization of the armed forces, and for the new weapons, possibly including production facilities, certainly including training/maneuvers and deployment. Spain will become a base for NATO as a whole, not only for the US, just as under EC membership she will become a market for the European Community as a whole, not only for individual countries. There will be a sharing of the costs of the Community/alliance as a whole, but Spain may well receive more than she gives. On the other hand her manpower will be at the disposal of the alliance, as will the lower level of military support in case of combat; the higher levels being reserved for the more centrally located powers.

Second, by joining, the EC countries and, and the NATO countries obviously hope to show expansionism, ^{convincing themselves and others} that the Community/alliance is stronger, in territory, population, resources than ever. In this there is a warning to the outside. But there is also a clear message to the inside of sharing risks. An expanded Community/alliance is an organization of solidarity; absorbing the shocks of economic decline together, sharing the risks in the sense of receiving incoming nuclear missiles together. In periods of economic growth there may be benefits to

share, in periods of economic decline considerable costs to share because of reduced autonomy in exploring one's own options. In periods of peace membership in an alliance may give a sense of security due to the alliance membership; in periods of war the bill for this sense of increased security will be presented in the form of guaranteed destruction, at least of any offensive capability the alliance may have on one's own territory, including the guiding facilities for such capabilities.

Third, and perhaps the most basic point: in inviting or accepting Spanish membership the Community/alliance will obtain one very important point: Spain will have to forego other options. The economic options are well known and relatively clear: ever increasing trade and economic cooperation in general with Latin America and other Latin countries around the world, with the Maghreb countries (but then Spain should make the Moros y Cristianos fiestas more future oriented and cooperative!) and with Mediterranean countries in general. This is where Spain is located geographically and historically. They are not artificial partners only differing from the North Atlantic countries by having less international prestige in the world of today and yesterday.

In the case of the NATO alliance alternative partners stand out less clearly because there has been neither much open thinking, nor much action along such lines. But it is relatively clear who ~~they~~ could be: the neutral and non-aligned countries in Europe and in the world - particularly in Maghreb and the Mediterranean in general. At present there are ten such neutral or non-aligned countries in Europe, not counting the mini-states: the "inner five" between East and West, Finland and Sweden in the North, Switzerland and Austria in the centre and Yugoslavia to the South, then there is Albania in a class all of its own, and there are the "outer four" Ireland, Spain, Malta and Cyprus - Spain's NATO membership not yet really confirmed. With the high level of inspiration the present Spanish government derives from the Partnerschaft-model of social democratic Austria cooperation with that country in neutral politics for Europe should come easily. The same could apply to several others of the "inner five", and as to the "outer four", the Catholicism of Ireland and the geographic and historical proximity to Malta should not make these countries less natural as partners than for instance Protestant and highly remote Norway, Denmark and Netherlands.

That Spain has the ability is already proven by her many constructive initiatives when hosting the Madrid Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe.

6. Conclusion: modernization yes, incorporation no?

In short, Spain has options. There are, objectively seen, even highly viable and interesting possibilities for a Spain concerned with other markets and affiliations than Western Europe, and other models of security than those held to be obtainable through NATO alliance membership, under US leadership. In my experience these options are generally more clearly seen in Brussels (both in the European Community and the NATO secretariats) than in Spain herself; geopolitical imagination perhaps being more developed outside than inside Spain. To limit Spanish options must be a major concern for Brussels. This does not mean to close them completely: the Community/alliance does not have that type of power. Moreover, they may want Spain to keep connections, but then in order to put them at the disposal of the Community/alliance as a whole. But is it in Spain's interest to accept Brussels as the seat of omnipotence and omniscience - the new Heaven? Is it obvious that this is also a seat of benevolence? Could it also be malevolent?

If this perspective is anywhere near the truth, the question immediately arises of whether the calculations made by certain Spanish elites is correct. Will the benefits in terms of modernization be higher than the cost in terms of options foregone, relative to the gains accruing to Spain, of a more direct material nature, from Community/alliance membership? Difficult to tell. Obviously there will be a locking-in effect - from the numerous rules and regulations of the European Community, all of them trickling down to the population at large through ever expanding technocracies modelled on Western European patterns. In those countries, however, there is now considerable resistance present in the population, from both pink, blue and green quarters, complaining that technocracy has become far too overpowering. That critique has not yet been much heard of in Spain for the reason already alluded to: there is not that much to criticise. Or rather, the critique of bureaucracy is that it is traditional and imperfect, the remedy is held to be its perfection, "modernization"; a far cry indeed from the Western European critique of bureaucracy not because

it is too perfect, the remedy being held to be its reduction, if not abolition - but certainly not its return to more traditional forms. All of this is very imperfectly understood in a Spain where the elites will tend to seek as partners for dialogue everybody but the green type of fundamentalist critics of the entire modernization exercise. The very appearance of Die Grünen in Germany is a more disturbing phenomenon to Spanish modernising elites than to most others.

Similar reflections can be made in connection with NATO membership, only more so. Professionalization of the army will take place under such conditions, but does that constitute any guarantee against a military coup? It seems fair to compare with other mediterranean NATO countries and as is well known, coups have taken place both in Turkey and Greece, and was the style of Portugal for most of the period. Moreover, without elaborating that theme here: with membership in NATO the military are already so strongly in command that no further coup may be necessary to secure their interests precisely because the military are brought into the State by becoming civil servants. NATO resolutions become an outside force that can no longer be countered with internal means. The policy of a small minority, such as the deployment of the 572 missile launchers, is carried out in spite of the largest peace movements in recent history.

In the name of NATO solidarity certain measures will be taken and they will all tend to strengthen rather than weaken the position of the military, even in the most democratic, civilian run system. Military growth attains the quality of a law of nature, as something objective, not only as the interests of one group in society pitted against the others. A military coup, then, would only be called for if NATO membership itself should be threatened, or if social structures favored by the military for other reasons are threatened. In short, NATO Membership is some kind of golpe institucionalizado, but within the context of modernization. And NATO may also institutionalize the non-Spanish character of Gibraltar as a NATO rather than a British base. Is it obvious that a NATO Gibraltar is more Spanish than a British Gibraltar? Or could it be less, because of some kind of international legitimacy?

Given all of this, and on top of it the resistance to Spanish EC

membership found in some member countries, notably in France, it is hard to believe that the pursuit of UCD strategy under PSOE leadership really will be that simple. There is so much at stake. Memberships tend to be irreversible, at least under the time span of one generation or so. And the alternatives seem so entirely viable that it is hard to believe that the present leadership will not also pursue proyecto modernizacion within the context set by alternatives that preserve autonomy, rather than through incorporation in a community itself threatened by disintegration and decline. A key variable here, incidentally, is probably dissemination of knowledge about international affairs to break the power of the very small group in Madrid (with rivalling groups in Barcelona) that possesses such knowledge, and also seems to steer the media relatively well. With increasing democratization in Spain no doubt that type of monopoly will also be challenged, again strengthening the forces of autonomy rather than those of incorporation.

Spanish politics, with the tremendous contradictions present in a country with relatively autonomous Church, Aristocracy and Military, is only possible under some consensus formula. Proyecto modernizacion is that single factor formula providing surprising continuity - as corporation building with economic growth, and as bureaucracy-building with social participation; the growth guaranteed by the corporations and the participation by the state - when it works. The questions raised in this article deal with the limits to modernization, in Spain, given that

- a) major power-holders in the country were not incorporated in the modernization process through some kind of French revolution;
- b) the social cosmology directing attitudes and behaviour of the Spanish people is only partly that of a modern, Western country;
- c) a major instrument chosen to bring about modernization, Western incorporation, brings with it major costs in terms of reduced international freedom of action - seen as gains by some, as risks by others.

To this could be added a fourth factor: in the countries members of the European Community and/or NATO there is rising discontent, not necessarily with membership but with basic policies; such as the CAP (common agricultural policy) for the EC and the "double track decision"(about the 572 missile launchers in the

five countries) for NATO. Sooner or later this will lead to basic changes.

It is difficult to tell, but there is something between incorporation and autonomy: associate membership in the EC, political membership, without military integration (French formula) for NATO. And all options open - still. Of interest for Spain?